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Abstract. We consider the use of cost sharing in the Aspnes model [1]
of network inoculation, showing that this can improve the cost of the
optimal equilibrium by a factor of O(
√
n) in a network of n nodes.
1 Introduction
A game-theoretic model of inoculation against viral infection was introduced by
Aspnes et al. [1]. Each player in this game is a node in an undirected connected
graph G with n nodes. Nodes represent network hosts that might become in-
fected, while edges represent direct communication links through which a virus
might spread. Each node has two possible pure strategies: either do nothing, or
inoculate itself (i.e. install anti-viral protection). After the nodes have made their
choices, an attacker selects one node uniformly at random to infect. Infection
then propagates through the graph; a non-inoculated node becomes infected if
any of its neighbors are infected.
Let I be the set of inoculated nodes. These nodes are in effect removed from
the graph, leaving a (possibly disconnected) graph of vulnerable nodes GI . Let v
be the initial node selected by the attacker. If v ∈ I, then v is not infected and
thus no nodes become infected. Otherwise, the infected nodes are precisely the
nodes in the connected component containing v. Given any node u, the connected
component containing u is denoted κu, and the size of this component is denoted
ku (with ku = 0 if u is inoculated). Henceforth “component” will always mean
a connected component of GI .
Let C be the cost of inoculation, and L be the loss suffered by an infected
node. Thus if u ∈ I , the cost borne by u is just C: otherwise u’s cost is Lku
n
,
because ku
n
is the probability of component κu receiving the initial infection.
Given these costs, the threshold size for a component is t = nC
L
. The set I gives
a Nash equilibrium if and only if both of these conditions hold:
– each component of GI has size at most t
– de-inoculating any node j ∈ I (i.e. putting j and all its adjacent edges back
in the graph) creates a component of size at least t
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In other words, if a component is larger than t, then each node in that component
would be better off paying the cost C to inoculate; if an inoculated node could
rejoin the graph and still be in a component smaller than t, it would be better
off not paying the cost of inoculation.
The social cost of I is the sum of individual costs. This sum can be written
as
C|I|+ L
n
∑
i
k2i (1)
2 Cost Sharing
A crucial feature of the Aspnes model is that one node can benefit from another
node’s decision to inoculate. This motivates consideration of a model in which
one node might pay part of the cost of another node’s inoculation. Such cost-
sharing models of network games have been studied by many authors (see [2] and
references therein), but this idea has not, so far as we are aware, been applied to
the Aspnes model previously. We have the same graph as in the original game,
but now a pure strategy for node i is a vector ai = (ai1 . . . a
i
n), where a
i
j is
the contribution made by node i to the inoculation of node j. Node j will be
inoculated if and only if ∑
1≤i≤n
aij ≥ C .
The individual cost for node i is
∑
1≤j≤n
aij + L
ki
n
We have the following necessary conditions for equilibria in this game.
Theorem 1. Let σ = (a1, a2, . . . an) be a pure-strategy equilibrium in the cost-
sharing Aspnes game. Then
1.
∑
j a
i
j ≤ C for all nodes i
2.
∑
i a
i
j is either 0 or C for all nodes j
3. Each ki ≤ nCL
4. If j is inoculated but de-inoculating j would not increase the size of κi, then
aij = 0
Also, the cost-sharing game and the original game have the same minimum social
cost.
Proof. Any node i violating (1) could reduce its cost by inoculating itself (i.e.
setting aii = C) and paying nothing for any other node. If (2) does not hold
for some j, then any node i with aij 6= 0 could reduce its cost by reducing
its contribution to j without changing j’s inoculation status. If (3) does not
hold then any node in κi could reduce its cost by inoculating itself. Any node i
violating (4) could reduce its cost by setting aij = 0, since this would not increase
i’s probability of infection; we call this condition locality. Note in particular
this implies that, if i is inoculated, then i does not contribute to the cost of
inoculating any node other than (perhaps) itself.
Since the cost-sharing game has a strictly larger set of strategies, its minimum
social cost can be no greater. On the other hand, let σ = (a1, a2, . . . an) be a
strategy vector minimizing social cost in the cost-sharing game (note σ need not
be an equilibrium), and let I be the resulting set of inoculated nodes. Since cost
is minimized, the total amount spent on inoculations is exactly C|I|. Thus we
can obtain the same social cost in the original game by inoculating all the nodes
in I and no others. ⊓⊔
Although cost-sharing cannot improve the social optimum, it can create bet-
ter equilibria. Consider a graph G with a cost-sharing equilibrium that inoculates
a set of vertices I, and let u ∈ I. Suppose there are k components τ1, . . . τk of
GI which are adjacent to u, with sizes t1, . . . tk. Let t =
∑
i ti and let tˆj = t− tj .
Since de-inoculating u would create a component of size t+ 1, the contribution
of u to its own inoculation can be no greater than L
n
(t+ 1). Because of locality,
only nodes from ∪iτi can contribute to inoculating u; therefore there must be
some node in some τj whose contribution is at least
C − L(t+ 1)/n
t
=
C
t
− L
n
t+ 1
t
.
However, since we are at equilibrium, this contribution must also be no greater
than L
n
(tˆj + 1). Combining these inequalities yields
nC
L
≤ t(tˆj + 2) + 1 .
This gives a lower bound on t:
Theorem 2. Let G be a graph on n nodes and let I be a set of inoculated nodes
which is obtained at an equilibrium of the cost-sharing Aspnes game with inocu-
lation cost C and infection cost L. Then any component created by de-inoculating
u ∈ I must have size at least √
nC
L
− 1 . (2)
Recall that without cost sharing, any component created by de-inoculating
a node must have size at least C
L
n. We now show that with cost sharing, the
bound (2) can be attained, and this can lead to a O(
√
n) improvement in the
cost of the best equilibrium.
Theorem 3. There exists a family of graphs on which cost-sharing improves the
best Aspnes equilibrium by a factor of O(
√
n).
Proof. Let Gn be a cycle on n vertices. We normalize to C = 1 and let n approach
infinity with L fixed and L > C.
We first show that, even allowing mixed strategies, the social cost of an
equilibrium of the original Aspnes game on Gn must be O(n). This expected
social cost is ∑
i
{ai + (1 − ai)L
n
Si} (3)
where ai is the probability that node i inoculates and Si is the expected size
of i’s component if i does not inoculate. At equilibrium, we have Si ≥ nL when
ai = 1, Si ≤ nL when ai = 0, and Si = nL otherwise [1]. A node i is called
nonbinary if ai is not zero or one. Note that if a nonbinary node i is adjacent
to node i + 1 with ai+1 = 0 then we must have Si = Si+1 =
n
L
, since the two
nodes must be in the same component if i does not inoculate. Similarly, if two
adjacent nodes have ai = ai+1 = 0 then Si = Si+1.
Now consider a node j with aj = 1. If there are no such nodes (or only one
such node), then the observations we have just made imply Si =
n
L
for all i (or
all i 6= j), giving an expected social cost of O(n). Otherwise consider the nodes
j + 1 and j − 1 adjacent to j. Note that
Sj = 1 + exp(kj−1) + exp(kj+1)
since if j does not inoculate it merges the components κj−1 and κj+1. But clearly
St ≥ exp(kt) for any node t; and since equilibrium requires Sj ≥ nL we must have
Sj−1 + Sj+1 ≥ n
L
− 1 .
So suppose without loss of generality that Sj+1 ≥ n−L2L . But this implies we
have at least n−L
2L
consecutive nodes j + 1, j + 2, . . . j + n−L
2L
with probability
of inoculation less than 1: otherwise Sj+1 could not be this large. Their total
contribution to the social cost (3) is O(n), since each such node j + 1 ≤ t ≤
j + n−L
2L
has St = Sj+1.
However, with
√
nL inoculated nodes evenly spaced around the cycle, break-
ing Gn into components of size
√
n/L− 1, we would have a social cost of
√
nL+
L
n
√
nL
n
L
= 2
√
nL . (4)
This set of inoculated nodes (and thus this social cost) can be attained at a
pure-strategy equilibrium in the cost-sharing game. If each node shares equally
in the cost of protecting the nearest inoculated node, its cost is
1√
n/L
+ L
√
n/L− 1
n
= 2
√
L
n
− L
n
By not making any contribution to the cost of inoculation, a node would create
a component of size 2
√
n/L− 1, incurring a cost of
L
2
√
n/L− 1
n
= 2
√
L
n
− L
n
.
It is easy to see (using the same reasoning as in theorem 1) that no other change
in a node’s strategy could produce a better result.
Note that the fragility of this equilibrium can be removed (while maintaining
a ratio of O(
√
n)) by inoculating (1−ε)√nL evenly-spaced nodes; then a node’s
cost will strictly increase if it does not contribute to inoculation. Finally, it is
easy to see that (4) is is in fact the social optimum; given the size of I, we
minimize
∑
k2i by distributing the inoculated nodes evenly, so (1) becomes
|I|+ L
n
|I|
(
n
|I|
)2
which is minimized at |I| = √Ln. Thus the price of stability (defined as the
ratio of the social optimum to the best equilibrium) is 1.
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